Credible, Strategyproof, Optimal, and Bounded Expected-Round Single-Item Auctions for All Distributions.
Meryem Essaidi, Matheus V. X. Ferreira, S. Matthew Weinberg.
Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (ITCS) 2022.

On Symmetries and Fairness in Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design.
Meryem Essaidi, S. Matthew Weinberg.
Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) 2021.

When to Limit Market Entry under Mandatory Purchase.
Meryem Essaidi, Kira Goldner, S. Matthew Weinberg.
Mechanism Design for Social Good (MD4SG) 2019.

Predicting Startup Crowdfunding Success through Longitudinal Social Engagement Analysis.
Qizhen Zhang, Tengyuan Ye, Meryem Essaidi, Shivani Agarwal, Vincent Liu, Boon Thau Loo.
ACM International Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM) 2017.

Minimizing Bias in Residency Matching: A Study in Non-Standard Random Walks.
Rebecca Baumher, Jeremy Bierema, Scott Buchanan, Meryem Essaidi.
Research report done for Senior Thesis.